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Wikipedia had been blocked in Turkey ever since April 29, 2017, allegedly because
of content in which Turkey was described as a state sponsoring terrorism. The
Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC) recently lifted the ban on Wikipedia and a
surge of, in my view, unwarranted optimism has now sprung out of nowhere both
among international and Turkish circles following the case closely. I fail to share
this optimism. Even Gönenç Gürkaynak, the attorney representing Wikimedia
Foundation, the chief complainant in the individual application case against the
Turkish government alleging a violation of its right to free speech, was guarded in his
tweet about the outcome of the Court’s decision. “I should not have needed to go to
the Constitutional Court nor the ECtHR in a matter like this,” Mr. Gürkaynak tweeted.
By all means, the lifting of the ban on Wikipedia is something to be happy about.
But the timing and content of the TCC’s decision, when especially read through
the political context in which it was handed down, do not give much reason to
celebrate. In this blogpost, I flesh out the reasons why the TCC’s decision lifting
the ban on Wikipedia must not occasion much optimism, but should rather provide
an opportunity for strategic reflection for those committed to the daunting task of
bettering the state of fundamental rights, and particularly speech-related rights, in
Turkey. Here are 4 salient reasons for caution.
1. The ruling was not unanimous, with 6 justices
dissenting
The Court currently has 16 members, which is a temporary anomaly. After Serdar
Özgüldür, who was a military court judge prior to his appointment – the practice
of which has ended with the 2017 amendments to the Constitution – retires, the
vacancy left by his retirement will not be filled. That will stabilize the composition of
the Court to having 15 members. But until then, the Court will continue to deliberate
sensitive cases like this as a panel of 16. And out of that 16, 6 have dissented,
reasoning that the blanket ban on Wikipedia was consistent with the requirement that
infringements on fundamental rights be “necessary in a democratic society”. 6 out of
16 is not a numeric figure to be dismissed briskly.
What is more, 5 of the 6 dissenters are President Erdogan appointees to the Court.
Erdogan appointees cannot be said to have a shared and robust constitutional
vision. However, with the exception of Prof. Dr. Yusuf #evki Hakyemez, a
constitutional law scholar appointed to the Court by Erdogan who sides with the
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“liberal half” of the Court, other Erdogan appointees virtually always tend to side with
the government in cases with heightened political significance to the government and
its critics.
In an earlier post, I suggested that the opposition could find some solace in the
fact that Erdogan may not be considered to have packed the court for at least two
reasons. First, he does not have the numbers yet. Only 6 out of the 16 (soon 15)
members are his appointees. Second, and far more important, Erdogan appointees
do not appear to have a written-in-stone kind of constitutional vision that enables
them to side with the executive all the time. Some of his appointees, as frequently in
the case of Justice Hakyemez for example, join many of the “liberal” decisions of the
Court. Thus, I still stand by my initial proposition. The accuracy of my argument will
ultimately be tested if and when Erdogan loses an upcoming election, because only
under a new executive (and also legislature) with a different political ideology will we
have the opportunity to see if the Court upholds most policy decisions taken by that
new executive (in which case it will not be possible to speak of an “Erdogan capture
of the Court”).
In the end, packed or not packed, 6 members of the Court have disagreed with their
colleagues lifting the ban. Unsurprisingly, the same 6 members were all among the
8 dissenters in the recent TCC case ruling that the government violated petitioners’
freedom of expression by prosecuting and penalizing members of the Turkish
academia who signed the “Peace for Academics” declaration for allegedly spreading
terrorist propaganda.
All of these 6 members of the Court have been recently appointed. Under current
law, of the 6 dissenters in the Wikipedia decision, the most senior is expected to
retire in 2024, others in 2026, 2027, 2028, 2031 and 2031, respectively.
2. The content of the joint dissenting opinion
cowritten by the dissenters raises concerns
Legal arguments are countered with legal arguments, regardless of the fact that
one’s legal arguments can be (and, in my opinion, inevitably are) reflective of
one’s own political ideology. Perhaps most frustratingly, the dissenting opinion in
the Wikipedia case does not read as a legal opinion. In other words, as I tried to
articulate under (1), that there are dissents in this case, 6 of them to be precise, is
alarming in and of itself. To add insult to injury, the content of the jointly-authored
dissenting opinion is equally alarming.
Conspicuously, there is not even a single precedent invoked in the dissenting
opinion. While the majority opinion references and, to a large extent, meaningfully
discusses Turkish and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) precedents,
the dissent fails to mention any. That, in turn, raises concerns as to whether the
dissenters have succeeded in articulating their disagreement with their colleagues in
the majority on legal terms.
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Substantively, the dissent keeps repeating two points in aid of the government: (i)
that Wikipedia was initially contacted by the government to remove specific content,
and was given time (4 hours) to do so, and that the government banned the entire
website only after Wikipedia remained silent about the government’s initial request.
The dissent seems to want to argue that because the government gave Wikipedia
some time, it had been gracious enough… The opinion dodges the actual and more
relevant question of whether the government’s request to Wikipedia to remove
certain, however specific, content from the website was a violation of Wikipedia’s
right to free expression in the first place. (ii) Second, the dissenting justices state that
at the time of the government’s request back in 2017, it might have been reasonable
to ban Wikipedia, because content in Wikipedia alleging the Turkish government to
have been involved in the Syrian war by allegedly supporting terrorist forces such
as ISIS spinoffs might have been especially dangerous for Turkish national security
at that specific time. For one, the idea that the government and Turkish national
security might have been especially susceptible to such content on Wikipedia in
2017 is mere speculation for which the dissent fails to provide any concrete and
factual support. For another, even if the dissent’s speculation were accepted, the
relevant question it still dodges is whether the Turkish government has remained
equally susceptible to the content on Wikipedia since 2017. In other words, the
dissent fails to speak on the issue of whether the ban which was perhaps once a
necessity from a Turkish national security perspective (again, mere speculation
unless grounded in evidence) remained as such through the end of 2019.
3. The TCC’s decision came very late
The Wikimedia Foundation applied to the TCC on May 9, 2017. The decision of the
Court was announced on December 26, 2019. Critics have reasonably asserted that
the timing of the decision was noteworthy. Indeed, Wikipedia had already applied to
the ECtHR in May 2019, obviously frustrated by the TCC’s unwillingness to take up
the case.
For better or worse, Wikipedia’s application to the Strasbourg Court seems to have
expedited the Turkish Court’s handling of the matter. Skeptics would argue, fearing
a declaration by the ECtHR that the TCC has even partially lost its ability to act
as an effective domestic remedy, the TCC, upon learning that the petitioners had
applied to the ECtHR, decided to consider Wikipedia’s case which had been before
the TCC for more than 2 years. Put in other words, if the case would have indeed
been considered by the Strasbourg Court, which would undoubtedly have issued
a judgment finding a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights on freedom of expression, the ECtHR would also have had occasion to
comment on the TCC’s failure to timely adjudicate the matter. And that could have
potentially resulted in a declaration finding the TCC’s failure to timely adjudicate the
case an indication of its deficiency to act as an effective domestic remedy for alleged
violations of the Convention. Perhaps The TCC, realizing that this had become
a possibility with Wikipedia’s taking the matter before the ECtHR, expedited the
process and finally adjudicated the matter. I must stress that I do not and cannot
confirm the factual accuracy of this narrative, but I feel obliged to report it as a not
implausible explanation for the TCC’s delayed decision. It is not impossible that the
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delay was occasioned by more mundane reasons having to do with, for instance,
workload.
If the motivation to preserve the TCC’s institutional reputation as an effective
domestic remedy for Convention violations played any role in pushing the TCC to
finally consider Wikipedia’s individual application, which it indeed might have, this
points to an awkward position in which the TCC may find itself in the near future
(if it already hasn’t): to avoid retribution from the Turkish government, the TCC
strategically delays consideration of politically salient cases such as Wikipedia’s,
but when confronted with potential “retribution” from the Strasbourg Court in the
form of a possible declaration on its effectiveness as a domestic remedy within
the Turkish legal system, the TCC finally gives in and considers the case. Perhaps
for the TCC, the Wikipedia decision is a win-win after all: it avoids harsh political
backlash by delaying, but ultimately rendering, a government-unfriendly decision and
it also avoids judicial rebuke from the ECtHR by considering the delayed case when
it appears that the ECtHR might start taking a look at it.
For Turkish citizens though, the TCC’s reputational calculus has a dire cost, in this
particular case, a ban on one of the world’s most frequented websites for more than
2 years. This is, above all, why the TCC’s decision is no cause for celebration.
4. The TCC’s decision was implemented with a
significant delay
The TCC announced its decision to lift the ban on Wikipedia on December 26, 2019.
But the block was lifted by Turkish authorities only on January 15, 2020. Why the
nearly 3-week delay? The answer is that the Turkish bureaucracy, backed up by the
government, is using what can only be described as “legalistic” defenses to delay
as much as possible what they consider to be unwelcome decisions by the TCC.
Their argument is that for the Court’s decision to have effect, the actual judgment (as
opposed to the mere announcement) must be issued, which happened in this case
via the publication of the Court’s judgment in the Official Gazette.
To be sure there is a legal argument to be made in the government’s defense. After
all, Article 153/4 of the Constitution provides: “Decisions of the Constitutional Court
shall be published immediately in the Official Gazette, and shall be binding on the
legislative, executive, and judicial organs, on the administrative authorities, and
on persons and corporate bodies.” It is not implausible to infer from the text that
the Constitution presupposes publication in the Official Gazette as a prerequisite
for a Constitutional Court decision to have binding effect. At the end of the day,
though, it is a choice to interpret the quoted provision in this way. Not delaying
execution of TCC judgments by implementing them as soon as the TCC announces
them, without waiting the reasoning behind the decision to be published, is also a
choice, and arguably a choice that bespeaks respect for the authority of the TCC.
Alas, the Turkish bureaucracy and politicians have been adamant in their legalistic
interpretation and consequent delay of implementing TCC decisions for some time.
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The Turkish government surely did not and should not emerge with an unsullied
reputation from the Wikipedia saga that has played out in the Turkish legal and
political scene since 2017. But nor should the Turkish Constitutional Court, which
has delayed consideration of the case for too long. Instead, the Turkish people who
have denounced the ban from the very beginning and condemned it in the court of
public opinion should – not to mention many who had been circumnavigating the
block using mirror URLs anyway (myself included)!
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